Latinforme

Many Cold War historiographers mistakenly view Betancourt as the ‘father of Venezuelan democracy,’ citing his apparent pragmatic centrism in his Accion Democratica and liberal reforms having helped Venezuela succeed amidst the Cold War tensions in Latin America. However, it is more productive to examine Venezuela under Betancourt and Pérez Jimenez as the most successful outcome the U.S. could have asked for in the Cold War: A Latin American ally that, by suppressing its own democracy and relying purely on foreign investment in oil, served American economic and political interests more than their own. Examining the case of Venezuelan-American diplomacy in the Cold War provides the perfect example of the ‘American Market Empire’ working just as intended with a willing participant.

Betancourt’s ‘nationalization through taxation’ approach to the oil industry saw him negotiate to quietly grandfather in existing American oil companies while selling an image of an independent Venezuela at home. Pérez Jimenez’s dictatorship provided Venezuela with an oil-boom fueled modernization project, helped by greater deference to U.S. oil. In Betancourt’s return, he consolidated power domestically by suppressing armed communist rebellions, courted the U.S. with economic partnership and an open commitment to opposing communism worldwide, and helped found OPEC to give the increasingly oil-reliant nation leverage with the U.S. While this gave Venezuela a foothold in the Cold War, it also tied the nation’s fortunes to the volatile price of oil and American consumption, paving the way for future economic and political instability. The case of Venezuelan-American diplomacy proves that the United States’ goal in Latin America was intended to prioritize American economic profit and power more than to preserve an ideology of democratic capitalism that opposed Soviet communism.

Defining ‘American Empire’ as a ‘Market Empire’

To better understand Venezuela as a successful implementation of the U.S.’ goals in South America, it is necessary to define the form American Empire took as a Market Empire. American Empire in the Cold War adopted a markedly different form from the European colonial empires of the previous centuries, shifting from territories under imperial control to satellite allies acting as sites for U.S. military bases and business investment. In the wake of WWII and a rebuilding Europe, the U.S. wielded significant cultural and ideological influence. The Marshall Plan deployed American values and culture in Europe. Michael E. Latham discusses the Alliance for Progress as a kind of “Latin American Marshall Plan,” reflecting a Kennedy administration belief in fostering economic independence and development through investment.[1] The U.S. offered aid in exchange for alliance against the Soviet Union.

In Latin American, the Alliance for Progress represented a manifestation of the containment policy by seeking to economically develop Latin America to prevent communism.[2] It echoes the rationale of FDR’s domestic New Deal programs as labor concessions to address working class concerns just enough to stop them from seeking out more radical solutions in communism. In discussing the political climate of Cold War Latin America, however, Latham overemphasizes the influence of the Soviet Union and an amorphous international Marxist threat by way of Cuba’s revolution.[3] The U.S. had a significant advantage over the Soviet Union in Latin American through proximity, familiarity, and history, and Latin American nations and peoples were not impressionable pawns for American or Soviet control. Romulo Betancourt, president of Venezuela in both 1945 and 1960, was involved in communist and socialist movements in Chile prior to WWII, stating in in 1941 that he rejected the Communist Party for “its dependence on Moscow”.[4]

The U.S.’s flexed of its economic might with the idealist trappings of the Kennedy administration to develop Latin America into a reliable ally dependent on American investment. While it launched with enthusiasm, as Latham identifies with excerpts from Time magazine calling it “a dream to be realized,” the actual results of funneling of hundreds of millions of dollars to Latin American oligarchies without a well-structured development plan left much to be desired.[5] Though the project did not meet its lofty goals, the investment allowed its Market Empire greater access to Latin American economies. The O.A.S., through U.S. State Department persuasion, voted overwhelmingly to embargo arms trade with Cuba and fourteen of the twenty-one states voted for expulsion.[6] Latin America was the U.S.’s battle to lose.

Cold War Foreign Policy – Based on Economic Goals or Ideology?

Despite the superficial depiction of the Cold War as a battle of liberal democracy vs. communism, the U.S.’s actions in the UN show ideology as a tool to further economic interests with the veil of righteousness. Mary Ann Heiss’s “Exposing ‘Red Colonialism’: U.S. Propaganda at the United Nations, 1953–1963” discusses the U.S.’s international efforts to depict the Soviet Union as an imperialist colonizer at the UN. Facing a Soviet Union that was employing decades of western colonialism in its rhetoric, the U.S. sought to re-define empire. Western colonialism was downplayed as transitory due to the many former colonies achieving independence, and the Soviet Union’s annexation of East Europe was decried as the “new colonialism” that would never allow for “natural evolution and development” through free markets.[7] As Heiss notes, this paternalistic approach failed to convince nonaligned and newly autonomous states who did not buy the U.S.’s red fearmongering and only found support in American allies. However, it did successfully influence the UN into condemning the Soviets.

The U.S.’s support of antidemocratic regimes, as explained by Heiss, hurt its international credibility when making public commitments to liberal democracy and capitalism as an antithesis to Soviet-style communism.[8] She continues to state that the history of segregation was a weakness for the U.S., though the positive international response to the highly publicized federally-enforced desegregation of a Little Rock high school despite the continuation of segregation de facto in many southern states mitigates the extent of this weakness.[9] The international credibility of the U.S. was somewhat threatened by Soviet rhetoric, but not so much to pressure the U.S. to make substantial domestic change. In the Cold War, a symbolic gesture of progress was enough. Ideology was for the U.S. a way to dress up its capitalist decisions like the Alliance for Progress as a means of ‘spreading liberal values’ and preventing communism.

As the U.S. sought to reinforce its foothold in Latin America amidst Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, it found a reliable partner in Venezuela. U.S. oil companies, present during the rise of Romulo Betancourt and the AD (Accion Democratica), negotiated with the newly anointed government to maintain control of the country’s oil acting as informal actors for U.S. interests. Miguel Tinker Salas’s “Staying the Course: U.S. Oil Companies in Venezuela, 1945-1958” highlights the unsung influence of the American oil companies in Venezuela during the AD’s initial rule and Pérez Jimenez’s reign. Salas argues these companies pushed for moderation of political views to attract U.S. support, citing a 1953 statement from the U.S. National Security Council portraying oil companies as instruments of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.[10] He critiques contemporary scholarship that sees the dictatorships as the only periods partial to U.S. oil firms, with the firms being challenged during the Trienio of the AD. Due to Mexico nationalizing its oil in 1938, Venezuela became an important source for oil to the U.S. Betancourt promised not to nationalize the oil industry despite popular support; he prioritized foreign capital but sought to do so subtly.[11] Venezuela’s new government understood the image of an independent Venezuela negotiating with the U.S. as equal peers would appease nationalist pride. Nationalization would cause a steep drop in oil revenues and empower domestic opponents with an economic crisis just months into the AD’s rule.

AD and U.S. oil worked in tandem to stop Communists in labor movements; Betancourt made assurances to have no Communists in his cabinet and in 1948 the CIA reported the administration was aligned with the U.S. in seeing the Soviet Union as a threat.[12] Salas describes the AD government as vulnerable and the U.S. attempted to help it discover coup attempts before they happened, finding several plots but refusing to prosecute them to avoid the public appearance of American meddling in Latin American affairs. Venezuela’s control of its domestic labor movement and efforts to support it while simultaneously excluding Communist involvement mirror the sentiments of the AFL-CIO’s later deployment in Latin America under Kennedy in fostering anti-communism among laborers.[13] In the Cold War’s Truman and Eisenhower years, Venezuela represented both an important source of energy and investment for the U.S. and a friendly government with a liberal democratic sheen that could negotiate subtle agreements to maintain U.S. economic interests. Salas’s writing adds valuable nuance to the ways American companies could act effectively as representatives of the U.S. during the Cold War, a distinct foreign policy advantage its capitalism afforded compared to the Soviet Union.

            Domestically, the U.S.’s increasing reliance on Venezuela created issues for American-based independent oil companies who were threatened by the cheap, abundant supply of Venezuelan petroleum. Thomas W. Zeiler’s “Kennedy, Oil Imports, and the Fair Trade Doctrine” documents the domestic considerations President Kennedy had to balance with the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) of 1962. In the middle ground, Kennedy allowed for protectionism to guard domestic sectors and regulate imports.[14] Cold War security concerns and booming industry necessitated expanded importation of petroleum to conserve U.S. deposits. This had the consequence of waylaying domestic U.S. oil producers and led to President Eisenhower’s Mandatory Quota Program of 1959. However, this prompted the formation of OPEC in 1960, with Venezuela as a founding member. Venezuela was the world’s top oil exporting country and was the sixth largest market for U.S. goods; jeopardizing this relationship would have significant economic consequences. However, Zeiler’s suggestion Venezuela was in danger of falling to communism overexaggerates the influence and threat of Castro. The Trienio government under Betancourt was overthrown not by Communist militants but by a military dictatorship in Pérez Jimenez. Betancourt himself was a staunch anti-Communist and worked to suppress Communist uprisings and root out Communists from labor organizations. Nonetheless, Kennedy took steps to maintain good relations with Venezuela, doubling loans to Caracas in 1961, permitting Latin American limits on imports from the U.S., and promising Betancourt to consult him first before changing the oil quota program.[15] Betancourt and Venezuela accepted the conditions, ensuring oil trade would continue between the two countries.

Cold War Policy in Latin America

            Inter-Latin American politics and conflicts undeniably factored into the U.S.’s foreign policy in the region. Stephen G. Rabe’s “The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1958–1963” argues that Betancourt’s rivalry with Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo was a significant factor in Betancourt aligning with the U.S. and his interest in participating in the Caribbean Triangle to prevent Communist dictatorships in the region. Kennedy openly stated that the U.S., while aiming for liberal democracy as a replacement to Trujillo in the wake of his assassination, should not rule out another dictator succeeding him if it meant preventing communism.[16] Further, Kennedy confessed that U.S. policy towards Latin American dictators would soften if it proved they were more effective opponents of communism and maintained the regional economic order of U.S. domination. This belief was a continuation of Eisenhower’s; the 1950s saw many Latin American dictators receive open support from Eisenhower due to his evaluation that these leaders were reliable allies.[17] Eisenhower’s support of oppressive regimes put the U.S. in a precarious position with the people of Latin America, most evident in Vice President Richard Nixon’s tour of South America where he was harassed and assaulted in Montevideo, Lima, and Caracas. The administration could only react by blaming the Communists for the uprisings that were bringing down the strongmen dictators it had once championed, a policy Kennedy would attempt to distance himself from with the Alliance for Progress and American financial aid to Latin America.

            Venezuela and the Dominican Republic were bitter rivals during 1958, with each country harboring the other’s exiles. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration was skeptical of Betancourt’s social democracy and taxation of U.S. oil. Kennedy embraced Betancourt as the antithesis to Castro, a model of success which other Latin American nations should follow. Betancourt rewarded the U.S.’s support and, unfettered by the absence of Trujillo, backed the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and led the charge to remove Cuba from the O.A.S.[18] However, Betancourt’s “model of success” would not be replicated by neighbors; instead, the U.S. continued to support anti-Communist dictatorships as liberal reformers failed to implement the goals of the Alliance for Progress. The Kennedy administration saw this as a greenlight to resume Eisenhower’s policy, albeit with the caveat that anti-Communist democratic leaders like Betancourt would be championed to give the U.S. a cleaner record of allyship.

Given the wide influence the U.S. had on Latin America, its countries often found themselves either aligning or opposing the U.S. Jeanne A.K. Hey’s “Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy” finds that reviewing the literature of Latin American foreign policy research reveals U.S. influence, lack of economic resources, regime ideology, and global distribution of power were the foremost factors affecting policy.[19] Hey criticizes existing research that overlooks internal and domestic Latin American politics and their effect on foreign policy. She details pro-core and anti-core as competing foreign policy paths taken by Latin American countries and regimes during the Cold War. Hey ascribes the label of “anti-core” to Pérez Jimenez, but this conflicts with his record of deregulation and relying on American investment. Betancourt is described as pro-core, which aligns with his political views, but by her own definition involvement in OPEC would make Venezuela anti-core, an organization created during his presidency.[20] Still, Hey’s assertion that Latin American foreign policy was about American dependence is compelling, given her statement that the U.S. was less interested in maintaining these economically dependent trading partners post-Cold War.

The U.S. in Venezuela – High Economic Output with Little Military Intervention

A declassified 1950 foreign policy statement from the Department of State discusses the U.S.’ diplomatic and economic objectives in Venezuela prior to the creation of OPEC. Under President Truman, the U.S.’ general outline of goals in Venezuela are to “assure an adequate supply of petroleum” for the use of wartime, to encourage the development of iron ore deposits to “supplement US reserves,” to “foster” economic stability and development, construct a foundation for democracy and a system of “free enterprise.”  The State Department justifies intervention by describing it as necessary in defending the economic interests of the Caribbean-Canal Zone. It is evident that the U.S. had every intention to “safeguard” Venezuela as a strategic spot in the Caribbean and South America, even competing with British oil companies, as the document describes Venezuelan resources as “of greater importance to us” than of those in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the policy of the U.S.’s loans and technical assistance to Venezuela show the country’s reliance not only on the American demand for oil but for its financial support. In the case of potential war, the document notes the Venezuela Armed Forces are expected to protect shipping and oil extraction installations to maintain a steady, guaranteed supply to the U.S., especially with the military equipment the country acquired during the Lend and Lease program of WWII.

The U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela was not unilaterally top-down as the complicity of American non-state actors a military coup in 1948 prove. Bethany Aram’s “Exporting Rhetoric, Importing Oil: U.S. Relations with Venezuela, 1945-1948” discusses the relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela during the Trienio and Betancourt’s first term as president. After fellow AD member Romulo Gallegos was elected in 1948 to succeed Betancourt, Gallegos was overthrown in November 1948 by a military coup that Betancourt accused of receiving counsel from the U.S. military and backing from oil companies.[21] This accusation revealed a discrepancy in the U.S.’s own foreign policy due to the Army and the CIA’s differing views on AD; the U.S. Army regarded AD as sympathetic to Communists and unable to maintain order, whereas the CIA regarded AD as a liberal democratic beacon against communism and an important pro-American force in the region. Due to the U.S.’s public pledge of non-interventionism at Bogota months prior, the Truman administration did little to prevent the military coup.[22] However, the Army disregarded this and had talks with the Venezuelan military which painted a picture of growing communist influence and planted worries over oil.

The Venezuelan military appealed to U.S. concerns over Soviet influence in Latin America and the U.S.’s tacit approval of the ensuing military coup in the country showed the Venezuelan military’s efforts bore fruit.[23] Colonel Edward F. Adams and American national and lawyer Robert T. Brinsmade collaborated with the coup, acting outside State Department boundaries to transform one of the greatest allies of the U.S. into a dictatorship in the hopes it would secure American oil interests and prevent the spread of communism. Aram estimates that U.S. representatives were too readily eager to accept any regurgitation of pro-American rhetoric as validation and that American oil companies and military officers were thus manipulated by the Venezuelan armed forces.[24] Given the U.S.’s track record of supporting dictators in the 1950s, this notion that the U.S. was manipulated and would have made a different decision had it possessed better intelligence ignores the possibility the oil companies and military preferred a military dictatorship ruling Venezuela with strict order. It benefited the U.S. oil industry to have Pérez Jimenez who was the most deregulatory Venezuelan leader in the Cold War era.[25]

Though the U.S. economically preferred military dictatorships in Venezuela for oil access as opposed to liberal democracies, it was not opposed to negotiating with democracies. Silvia Pedraza and Carlos A. Romero’s “Venezuela’s Foreign Policy: Large Presence, Excessive Resources” traces the history of American relations with Venezuela during the twentieth century. Military dictator Juan Vicente Gomez’s reign during 1908-35 and Pérez Jimenez’s later rule during the 1950s saw the U.S. have its easiest access to Venezuelan oil.[26] However, even with the democratic rule of Venezuela from 1945-48 and post-1958, the U.S. and Venezuela still maintained a mutually beneficial relationship as the U.S. was Venezuela’s top oil buyer and developed into an ideological pro-American attack dog in Latin America under Betancourt during the early 1960s. At home, Betancourt and his successor Raul Leoni dealt with Cuba-sponsored Communist guerillas and multiple coup attempts from both political flanks.[27] Betancourt’s anti-communism was so far-reaching that he outflanked the U.S. with the Betancourt Doctrine, a strict stance to not recognize any military regimes that overthrow democratically elected governments. Venezuela held itself as a democratic nation and important ally for exporting oil to the U.S.

Betancourt’s Venezuela – A ‘Colony’ in America’s Market Empire

Damas and Lowe write in their book Rómulo Betancourt: His Historical Personality and the Genesis of Modern Democracy in Venezuela that the overthrow of the military dictatorship in 1958 cannot be separated from the greater Cold War diplomatic machinations, as the reinstatement of the AD relied heavily on U.S. support.[28] The foremost concern was the security of oil supplies, which was “guaranteed” under Pérez Jimenez’s military dictatorship. The U.S. State Department’s apparent “complacency” to dictatorship was well-known amongst Venezuelans, and Betancourt knew that U.S. support was critical.[29] Betancourt, while critical of the U.S., also made it clear that he and the AD would support the U.S. in its fight against communism in Latin America. Damas and Lowe tend to exaggerate the influence that President Kennedy and Betancourt’s relationship had in their coalition against Cuba, citing their “personal friendship” as a significant factor.[30] They emphasize the impact of Fidelista armed attacks in Venezuela, however, resulting in the exclusion of Cuba from the O.A.S. and directly participating in the U.S.’s blockade against Castro. Damas and Lowe’s characterization of Betancourt represents an extreme, but not uncommon flaw in the historiography of U.S.-Venezuelan relations during the Cold War. The authors refer to Betancourt as the “Father of Modern Venezuelan Democracy,” providing few examples of how he promoted democracy other than his promotion of capitalism tied to the oil industry.[31] Rather than describing him as an opportunist, like many other Cold War historians, Damas and Lowe praise his creativity in diplomatic objectives and paint him as an exemplary patriotic leader that was interested in the “democratic well-being” of Venezuela.

C.A. Hauberg’s article “Venezuela under Betancourt” is a timely political opinion piece published in 1961, not long after Betancourt reclaimed control over Venezuela. By 1930, Hauberg writes that Venezuela solidified itself as a nation that excelled in the export of natural resources but lacked in government organization under the cruel dictator General Gómez. Hauberg is critical of Pérez Jimenez, sharing a common historiographical critique against the U.S.’s support for Latin American dictators. Wary of Venezuela’s pattern, Hauberg examines Betancourt with a hesitant hopefulness for a democratic pivot from despotism. He particularly expresses hope for Betancourt to keep his word on refraining from nationalizing the Venezuelan oil industry and maintaining friendly relations with “foreign businessmen and countries,” namely the U.S..[32] Hauberg pushes the State Department’s justification for intervention in Latin America, stating that communism is “knocking at our very doorstep,” and that the U.S. should place significant importance on good relations with Venezuela to further prevent Soviet expansion.[33] If the U.S. and the O.A.S. fail to support Betancourt, the Caribbean would fall to Communist dictatorship. He reiterates a hopefulness in good relations, citing the success of American culture – “American tires, autos, movies, toothpaste,” American phrases like “O.K.” and “all right,” and baseball – and thereby, highlighting the necessity of the expansion of a ‘Market Empire’ that should dominate the hemisphere.[34] This influence, as had happened with the Marshall Plan, sold the idea of America in ways that penetrated the cultural zeitgeist.

Steven Schwartzberg’s “Rómulo Betancourt: From a Communist Anti-Imperialist to a Social Democrat with US Support” traces the pragmatic evolution of Venezuelan leader Romulo Betancourt from his origins as an anti-democratic member of the Costa Rican Community Party to publicly welcoming the U.S. and liberalism.[35] Betancourt astutely understood that homages to U.S. political leaders like FDR and the Founding Fathers would help win over U.S. support. Betancourt’s Accion Democratica handily won the nation’s first free elections in 1947, electing successor Romulo Gallegos to the presidency. The State Department and CIA were thrilled with the budding success of the anti-Communist Latin American democracy. Schwartzberg argues U.S. policy was too passive with Venezuela, that a minor intervention could have prevented democracy from collapsing to a military coup. He takes paints a flattering picture of Romulo Betancourt, one worth interrogating given the relatively quick collapse of democracy after his departure from office. He places much importance on the ability of U.S. intervention to sway a nation, downplaying the domestic historical factors that made Venezuela’s democratic prospects fragile like its long history of dictatorships. Though Schwartzberg’s analysis and critique of U.S. policy focuses too much on individual failure rather than the failure of CIA intelligence, he does astutely identify the failures of U.S. foreign policy in being overly passive. This mistake helped paint Truman’s Cold War approach as weak – a perception that Eisenhower and more hardline anti-Communists would successfully run on.

America’s Preference for ‘Friendly’ Dictators

Enrique A. Baloyra’s article “Oil Policies and Budgets in Venezuela, 1938-1968,” provides an economic analysis of Venezuelan oil policies and how they were uniquely molded to the U.S.. In congruence with the historiography on the matter, Baloyra summarizes the Pérez Jimenez’s regime as marked by corruption and a “laissez-faire attitude” towards the oil industry and foreign capital investment.[36] This earned Pérez Jimenez favor with President Eisenhower, proving that the U.S. was less concerned with that safeguarding of democracy in Latin America – it was capitalism they wished to protect, supporting dictators like Pérez Jimenez for inexpensive access to natural resources. Baloyra describes the beginning of the Betancourt regime in 1958 as a continuation of Pérez Jimenez. Venezuelan oil policy under Betancourt responded primarily to a decline in prices for Venezuelan and Middle Eastern crude companies, pushed further by Eisenhower’s proclamation in March 1969 that established “mandatory controls” of U.S. oil imports.[37] In response, Betancourt and Venezuelan Minister Pérez Alfonso negotiated revised oil policies with the U.S., resulting in a $300 million loan from the U.S. to help the oil economy recover. Baloyra argues that the primary reason why Pérez Jimenez failed was because he failed to control the “oil bonanza” of 1956-1957, not because the U.S. underwent a change of heart against ‘friendly’ dictatorships.[38] Dictatorship or democracy, the U.S. made clear that its priority was to expand a ‘Market Empire,’ not promote legitimate democracy and societal improvement. Baloyra concludes that Venezuela was an exceptionally reliable oil supplier to the U.S., and that U.S. oil companies were confident in adapting to any leader as they leveraged the fate of Venezuela’s U.S.-reliant oil economy to keep them as an ally.[39]

Michael Derham’s “Undemocratic Democracy: Venezuela and the Distorting of History” covers the contentious relationship with democracy in Venezuela throughout the 20^th century. Derham is critical of the “mythmaking” of a popular democratic Venezuela by American scholars ignoring that people could want centralized rule.[40] He views the democratic years of Venezuela as fragmented and anti-nationalist. Where Schwartzberg viewed Betancourt’s political evolution as pragmatism, Derham criticizes it as a lack of principles in deference to power. He justifies the military coup stating it defended national interests for wider representation. Given the large margins by which Gallegos was freely elected, Derham’s argument that the AD administration did not reflect the will of the Venezuelan people is questionable. Nonetheless, he covers the ways Pérez Jimenez improved infrastructure using U.S. oil profits and addressed rural agricultural concerns and formalized many government functions, and points to his later election to Congress in Caracas in 1968 as proof of his popular appeal.[41] Importantly, Derham compares Pérez Jimenez’s policy of continuous economic growth to later Venezuelan leaders’ reliance on riding the highs (and suffering the lows) of the infrequent oil booms, showcasing his foresight and foreshadowing the eventual economic disaster of modern Venezuela.

Conclusion

Historical scholarship on the Cold War has shifted over time to view the United States as an empire that achieved varying success and influence in the countries it intervened in. Vietnam is the most discussed example of that empire in action, cited particularly to highlight the U.S. fallibility in its containment strategy. Just as worthy of study, however, is how the U.S. operated as a successful empire in Latin America, particularly Venezuela until the 1990s. Ultimately, the U.S. ‘won’ the Cold War in Latin America – the majority of Latin America today has friendly economic and diplomatic relations with the U.S., and American culture has undoubtedly changed Latin American consumer and political culture for the proliferation of capitalism. Venezuela, however, severed diplomatic ties with the U.S. under Hugo Chávezin the late 1990s, with relations between the two countries worsening under the current ‘communist’ dictator, Nicolas Maduro. Historiographical consensus on why Venezuela turned to communism after the Cold War relies on the examination of U.S. domestic and economic policy with Venezuela. There are two prevalent opinions as to why the relationship fell apart: the first faults the intense interventionism from the U.S. and dedication to supporting dictators, so long as they allowed U.S. companies access to inexpensive oil and land; the second faults Venezuelan leaders, particularly Betancourt, for his purely opportunistic diplomacy with the U.S. and failure to expand the economy beyond oil production. The least satisfying answer, though most accurate, is a mix of both. American economic and political imperialism in Venezuela was a temporary success that proved unsustainable coupled with a ‘Dutch problem’ made worse by Venezuela’s interest in quick financial gain. The future research on this topic can be enhanced by looking more into the actions non-state actors, such as the private dealings of U.S. oil companies and unofficial military actions, which can offer a better understanding of the complex gears within the machine of America’s ‘empire.’ It would also benefit from the inclusion of more Latin American perspectives, as U.S. foreign policy was often misinformed by misunderstandings of Latin American politics and culture.

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[1] Latham, Michael E. “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress.” Diplomatic History 22, no. 2 (1998): 199–229. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913658, 199.

[2] Latham, 200.

[3] Latham, 208.

[4] Schwartzberg, Steven. “Rómulo Betancourt: From a Communist Anti-Imperialist to a Social Democrat with US Support.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 3 (1997): 613–65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/158354, 633.

[5] Latham, 223.

[6] Latham, 216.

[7] Heiss, Mary Ann. “Exposing ‘Red Colonialism’: U.S. Propaganda at the United Nations, 1953–1963.” Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 82–115. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26926208, 86.

[8] Heiss, 114.

[9] Romano, Renee. “No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the State Department, and Civil Rights, 1961-1964.” The Journal of American History 87, no. 2 (09, 2000): 546-579. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/no-diplomatic-immunity-african-diplomats-state/docview/224887618/se-2, 578.

[10] Salas, Miguel Tinker. “Staying the Course: U.S. Oil Companies in Venezuela, 1945-1958.” Latin American Perspectives 32, no. 2 (2005): 148.

[11] Salas, 151.

[12] Salas, 154.

[13] Field, Thomas C. “Transnationalism Meets Empire: The AFL-CIO, Development, and the Private Origins of Kennedy’s Latin American Labor Program.” Diplomatic History 42, no. 2 (2018): 305–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26499586, 307.

[14] Zeiler, Thomas W. “Kennedy, Oil Imports, and the Fair Trade Doctrine.” The Business History Review 64, no. 2 (1990): 286–310. https://doi.org/10.2307/3115584, 287.

[15] Zeiler, 293.

[16] Rabe, Stephen G. “The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1958–1963.” Diplomatic History 20, no. 1 (1996): 55–78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913445, 55.

[17] Rabe, 56.

[18] Rabe, 76.

[19] Hey, Jeanne A. K. “Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy.” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 4 (1997): 631–57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993209, 631.

[20] Hey, 635.

[21] Aram, Bethany. “Exporting Rhetoric, Importing Oil: U.S. Relations with Venezuela, 1945-1948.” World Affairs 154, no. 3 (1992): 94–106. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672311, 94.

[22] Aram, 96.

[23] Aram, 100.

[24] Aram, 102.

[25] Baloyra, Enrique A. “Oil Policies and Budgets in Venezuela, 1938-1968.” Latin American Research Review 9, no. 2 (1974): 28–72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2502722, 49.

[26] Pedraza, Silvia, and Carlos A. Romero. “Venezuela’s Foreign Policy: Large Presence, Excessive Resources.” In Revolutions in Cuba and Venezuela: One Hope, Two Realities, 1st ed., 128–50. University Press of Florida, 2023. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.1614177.11, 128.

[27] Pedraza and Romero, 130.

[28] Damas, Germán Carrera, and Elizabeth Lowe. Rómulo Betancourt: His Historical Personality and the Genesis of Modern Democracy in Venezuela. 1st ed. University Press of Florida, 2021. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1mvw939, 183.

[29] Damas and Lowe, 186.

[30] Damas and Lowe, 220.

[31] Damas and Lowe, 303.

[32] Hauberg, C. A. “Venezuela under Betancourt.” Current History 40, no. 236 (1961): 232–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45310524, 237.

[33] Hauberg, 239.

[34] Hauberg, 240.

[35] Schwartzberg, Steven. “Rómulo Betancourt: From a Communist Anti-Imperialist to a Social Democrat with US Support.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 3 (1997): 613–65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/158354, 614.

[36] Baloyra, 49.

[37] Baloyra, 48-49.

[38] Baloyra, 52.

[39] Baloyra, 55.

[40] Derham, Michael. “Undemocratic Democracy: Venezuela and the Distorting of History.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 21, no. 2 (2002): 270–89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3339456, 271.

[41] Derham, 280.